

## **Poverty, Corruption, and Property Rights In Communist Vietnam**

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*“Where there is no property, there is no justice.” – John Locke (1632 – 1704)*

Communist Vietnam counts among the poorest countries of the world. Vietnam fares much worse than either its neighbors or counterparts. China's GDP per capita represents almost three times that of Vietnam even though both countries were at about the same level in 1975. Based on the most optimistic results achievable under the Doi Moi (Renovation) Program, it will take Vietnam 25 years to catch up with Thailand. Concurrent with this state of backwardness, an unprecedented level of corruption has also pervaded all levels of the Vietnamese society. Corruption is a widely acknowledged phenomenon inside Vietnam. The Vietnamese communist press has discussed some major cases. In a number of instances, the Government of Vietnam punished the perpetrators. For example, in the Thai Binh's situation, local officials were punished as well as a number of leaders of the farming community. In other cases, resolutions remain intractable because the alleged perpetrators are members of the politburo, the highest office of the communist apparatus (1).

Why is communist Vietnam so poor? Why is corruption endemic? To address these central questions, the perspective offered in this paper is centered on the issues raised by the treatment of property rights by the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV).

Many rights are “officially” recognized in Vietnam. For instance, the right of association and freedom of expression are specified in the constitution. Private property rights are also provided: farmers can own the right to use their plot, merchants can own their store, etc. The effectiveness of these rights depends, however, on the rules and regulations defined by the Government of Vietnam. The nature of these rules and regulations is, in turn, determined by the policies pursued by the CPV. We will discuss these policies and their far-reaching consequences.

- We will first focus on well-accepted explanations regarding corruption.
- We will next examine the consequences engendered by the CPV policy on property rights. In communist Vietnam, most goods, commodities, and resources are “public” – i.e. state-owned - because they belong to the State. The CPV claimed that the “public” attribute of these goods is what makes them most effective in promoting social equality. We will discuss the effects that these state-owned goods introduce in the generation and redistribution of wealth.
- Following familiar communist tenets, it is further argued that state-guided production is, in terms of resource allocation and production efficiency, superior to any other systems of production. However, instead of economic growth, wealth and social equality, poverty and pervasive, endemic corruption plague the Vietnamese economy. We will examine the causes of these shortcomings.

## **Common perception on corruption**

The World Bank (2) stated that: "The state's monopoly on coercion, which gives it the power to intervene effectively in economic activity, also gives it the power to intervene arbitrarily. This power, coupled with access to information not available to the general public, creates ample opportunities for public officials to promote their own interests, or those of friends or allies, at the expense of the general interest". This statement describes one of the main causes of corruption. Indeed, the CPV, by having the monopolistic control over all aspects of economic life, grants Vietnamese Government officials extraordinary discretionary powers. The CPV-created institutional environment creates the Vietnamese bureaucrat who is eminently powerful and virtually untouchable.

In addressing the curse of corruption and excessive bureaucracy, the sixth plenary meeting of the CPV Central Committee resolved, on January 25 - February 2, 1999, to launch a three-year "criticism and self-criticism" campaign to rid the party of its bad elements and restore leadership (3). In other words, self-purification is the guiding principle in providing an internal system of checks and accountability, which currently may not be adequate or does not exist. The CPV position here is - it should be emphasized - that the corruption problem rests essentially with a number of individuals who abused their power. Corruption is not the product of a communist system of organization whose values are deemed appropriate.

Contrary to the CPV position on corruption, it is argued in this paper that the causes of corruption and poverty in the Vietnamese society are the ways in which the CPV organizes the economy with its policy objectives, directives, rules and regulations to ensure achievement of these objectives. We will elucidate our arguments by using the case of the CPV policy on "land to the tillers" in the framework of the Doi Moi Program.

## **Right of use: a case study**

From 1975 to 1985, the collectivist experiment choked off the Vietnamese economy. The total command and control of the economy was of little use since the country was heading towards total collapse. Doi Moi changed course and alleviated some of these production problems by relaxing a number of controls. One of Doi Moi's changes allows farmers to control what they want to grow on the land provided for their use and be the owners of the cash flow that they generate with their own labor.

In Vietnam, an individual can legally own the use of up to 3 hectares of land to farm it for a period not exceeding 20 years. Subjected to the 3 hectares limit, land transactions are, however, tightly regulated (4). Because of these constraints, land transactions among private citizens only occur on an exception basis. In addition, farmers have little control over the income they may generate from working the land as practically all aspects of farming – for example, procurement of seeds and fertilizers, irrigation, crop sale and export, credit etc... – are controlled by either a government agency or a state-owned enterprise (SOE), which has monopoly rights on these

activities. Farmers have no leverage in bargaining for better terms of trade from these public and para-public organizations.

A single bad crop, caused by inclement weather, is sufficient to force farmers to sell their land back to the government to pay for debts they accumulate while purchasing seeds and fertilizers. Financially, farmers (small by the plot standard) are always in a precarious position. This rigidity in private ownership and its related costs put farmers in an unwinnable position. The State, through its land allocation process and associated agricultural policies, effectively, remains the owner of the land. In other words, what is provided on the one hand to the individual farmer, i.e., right to use the land, can be rendered ineffective through the State's control of other aspects of farming: costs of fertilizers, sales of crop, etc. The precarious nature of the right to use and transact the land in the face of income uncertainties due to procurement and price restrictions gives little incentive to farmers to invest and enhance the value of the land. They will do little more than what is required to feed themselves and their families since the additional effort will not improve their welfare. This is the primary cause of under-production in agriculture.

The case of farm land is quite important because of a number of reasons.

- First, in agrarian Vietnam, it affects 80 percent of the population whose livelihood depends on their tenure of the land.
- Second, because of its sheer dimension and significance, the farm land case is representative of CPV policies in other matters as well. Invariably across the whole economic spectrum, the CPV policy is to render the conditions of successful private production largely unattainable (e.g., small plot of land, costs of agriculture input/output imposed by state monopolies) in addition to setting highly restrictive rights to transfer wealth (e.g., the transfer of the right to use the land is practically infeasible).
- Formal legal rights – i.e., rights granted by CPV - have little value and meaning when the associated costs pertaining to the exercise of these rights are rendered prohibitive through government rules, regulations and policies. In addition, the right to control critical aspects of land-related transactions gives CPV members ample latitude to pursue whatever activities they so desire, including the abuse of that prerogative by selectively and temporarily relaxing that control in exchange for a bribe.

Individuals are being denied the possibility to become successful. *For these reasons, we are saying that effective private property rights are purposely negated by the CPV.* This is no surprise however since private holdings, and its related forms, are anathema to communist regimes. Such a treatment of property rights by the CPV is based on its fundamental belief that the State represents the interests of the general population more equitably and effectively since it is unencumbered by individual motives. To address these fundamental issues, let us first elaborate on the nature of the associated costs of goods.

## **Ownership of costs defines rights over goods**

Inherent to any commodity, there are related costs. It costs to either produce or acquire a good or service. It also costs to maintain the value of a good and service. Costs, in other words, define the feasibility of rights. Consider some of the following types of costs.

**Cost of transfer.** In a sale transaction, a loss or a profit can be made. In a sale transaction of a private good, an individual expends real resources on a commodity to enhance its value and incurs additional costs to transfer the ownership of that commodity to a willing purchaser. In the case of goods that belong to the State, i.e., state-owned goods, the situation is radically different.

- For state-owned goods, the resources needed to either acquire them or transfer their use to another party are neither absorbed and nor imputed to any particular individual. *No government official is personally liable for costs or losses incurred in transactions involving state-owned goods. Simply put, those who make decisions create costs that are borne by others and the society at large: this is the worst form of ownership for there is no mechanism to ensure accountability.*
- Profit is anathema to communist doctrine because it is argued that it represents a source of social inequality. Therefore, profit when made flows right back to the State and does not constitute any form of personal incentive to government officials. Nevertheless, an element of “capture” can be realized when the original owner (the State) of the good does not receive what the recipient of the good expends to acquire it. The capture factor represents corruption when the government official who approves the transaction can manipulate the exchange to his personal advantage at the expenses of the State and the society at large.

**Cost of protection.** Agreements reached in a sale define that transaction. The enforcement of the terms of the agreement is the measure of the sanctity of the contract in the society. For a private business, the discretionary control of the central and local governments at critical points of a sale process makes “protection” necessary because of ill-defined property rights. The greater the number of controls, the higher is the need for protection. For either a local or a central government official, similar protection is also “desirable” because the personal benefits they capture in such an exchange have to be kept secret. *In other words, almost everyone needs “protection” in a transaction that involves personal benefits of any kind.* If such protection becomes effective, the “privileges” or personal rights over goods, whether private or state-owned, are enhanced. In turn, the protection authority will erect further rules, regulations and legal institutions to preserve the profitable arrangement.

All of the preceding conditions are present in communist Vietnam. Dinh (7) described how excessive and contradicting legislations are contributing to making fertile grounds for corruption. The preceding conditions do not come to existence by accident. Rather, ambiguous policies, rules and regulations are enacted to permit transactions that are not otherwise possible. The delineation of the rights over goods comes from self-enforced agreements among individuals who have an advantage in getting the protection and others who benefit in providing them. With the absence of well-defined legal private rights, *these protection agreements have to be proctored outside of the existing legal structure and can only be, however, of temporary value.* In such an environment, it is without saying that an acceptable measure of predictability to conduct business is very hard to achieve. Limited predictability deters investment and dampens economic activities and growth.

It should be clear by now that a sound comprehension of the ownership of the associated costs of goods is fundamental to understanding the rights over these goods. The ownership of costs determines the associated rights over these goods. From the cost perspective, the prerogatives of government officials are quite extreme:

- For state-owned goods, the costs of transaction are borne by others. Accountability cannot be realized under this condition.
- For private goods, their discretionary powers allow them to determine the outcome and nature of a transaction agreement.
- In all cases, the potential to exact a bribe exists.

These exceptional conditions are justifiably under the control of CPV members because they serve the public needs. Control rights are, however, only one aspect of that framework.

## **The myth of equitable distribution of wealth**

According to communist precepts, private holdings and the factors that help to enforce these institutions – profit is one such prominent example - are the primary causes of social inequality. Following this logic, state-based wealth, represented by state-owned goods, is paramount to the wealth of a nation. Devoid of any individual imperatives, the pool of state-owned goods can fully be utilized to promote social equality by addressing the broader and higher needs of the population.

Communist Vietnam follows these precepts to the letter. Taking away from the rich and eliminating mechanisms that would allow differences in personal wealth to resurface are policies that are pursued in the drive toward social equality. The CPV very effectively and swiftly achieves these objectives. Wealth that is accumulated belongs to the State. That is the easy part.

The redistribution of wealth to the general population represents however a totally different challenge. *The feasibility of equitable redistribution hinges on a number of fundamental issues, none of which is, however, resolved to any degree of satisfaction.*

- It is often assumed that the CPV represents the interests of the general population. Nothing is further from the truth. Politicians gain power when they are effective in promoting the interests of groups that are organized. Groups that are not organized - such as the rural population, which constitutes 80 percent of the population in Vietnam - yield little power and consequently are left out and stay on the margins of the society. *It is therefore important to point out that the CPV only represents its own narrow constituencies, and not the public interests.*
- The determination of a “just” price (price being a measure of scarcity) for transacted commodities, “fair” compensation for services rendered, etc., are fundamental to equitable redistribution. Criteria used to define these equality mechanisms have, however, never been conceived or worked out. Therefore the problem of equality, or more explicitly, *the question of a fair or equal redistribution of wealth has never been resolved in any communist regime.*

*Instead, as it will be discussed later, there only exist discretionary mechanisms that cater to current political expediencies and compromises.*

- It is said that private citizens have no rights over state-owned goods. Therefore, profiting from state-owned goods for private purposes would not be feasible. State-owned goods are, therefore, the preferred repositories of the national wealth for distributional purpose. The view is that rights are regarded as absolute, rights exist or they don't and that there is no intermediate state. Unfortunately, this last assumption only represents a convenience for argumentation but is not valid in reality. Let us explain.

## **Control rights are private rights for a very few**

Barzel (5) observed that what really matters for an individual is his ability to “use” a given commodity. Under these considerations, it can be seen that the extent to which an individual can enjoy the attributes of a good actually defines his rights over that good. To make his point, Barzel stated that “anyone who expects to benefit from an asset, be it a legal owner or a thief, is (at least) a partial owner”. To include this real but informal dimension, Barzel defines property rights to include legal (formal) property rights and economic (informal) property rights (1).

In the case of an import/export license, price controls, land, etc., one can observe that the guardians of the state-owned goods, i.e., CPV members, have exclusive prerogatives over the benefits that these state-owned goods can provide:

- They can derive income from them in the form of capture at transaction time.
- They can exclude others from using them.
- They can also grant similar advantages to selected others.

*It is emphasized that each one of the preceding prerogatives represents in fact an attribute of private ownership. The first one, which results in monetary gains, is the result of corruption. The second and third prerogatives are attributes of private discretionary power. One can now realize that the attempt to eradicate private property rights in communist systems has never been able to prevent “informal” forms of private rights – i. e., economic rights - to exist. In other words, legal rights are what the communist system legislates, and economic rights represent the actual forms that these rights take in the environment affected by this legislation. Rights are therefore neither absolute nor wholesome. Rather, rights are partial, fragmented and discrete. With these distinctions in place, it becomes clear that the control rights that CPV members have over state-owned goods represent in fact their own and exclusive private rights over these goods.*

The informal, yet real and highly tangible, forms that these rights take yield, however, insidious results with far-reaching consequences:

- This fixation on public wealth based on state-owned goods renders private wealth, regardless of its source, highly suspect. In such conditions, personal wealth, when generated, has to

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<sup>1</sup> Footnote: This paper uses the conceptual framework developed by Barzel to analyze property rights

either be hidden (cash hoarding) or flee the country (money laundering). Both cases constraint the economic growth of Vietnam.

- The use of these control rights to enhance the welfare of all Vietnamese is what the CPV likes to profess. But in a regime that practices divisiveness as a means to govern, the common thread that can drive activities of any significance cannot be any more than the least common denominator found in the society: it is the greedy needs of individuals. Benevolent behavior has therefore little room in Vietnam.
- It is much worse, however. None of the control rights are transferable. This transient characteristic of rights instills a potent incentive to seize whatever opportunity presents itself. Any reason for restraint is lacking since state-owned goods belong to no one: what one does not take, others will. *This behavior can be equated with that of a “roving bandit”, using Olson’s terminology (6), a characterization which underlines the predatory trait of such a destructive combination of factors.*
- In such a distorted one-sided framework, the corruption domain is in essence equated with the state-owned domain. State-owned goods are no longer understood in this context as goods or services produced for the benefit of all Vietnamese. They are distinctly different: they have instead become a “chasse garde” for members of the CPV.

*Instead of being the repository and source of wealth for the benefit of all, state-owned goods have turned instead into an exclusive source of appropriation that only benefits a very few, i.e. members of the CPV. The population-at-large is excluded and is fundamentally disadvantaged. The negation of private property rights as a mechanism to promote social equality is therefore a mistaken belief. As long as this policy is maintained, the appropriation of economic rights by those who are in a position to benefit will continue to prevail with all the perversity and socially detrimental effects that such an arrangement can provide. Under these conditions, the myth of the property of the state as a beneficial repository of wealth for the general population should be put to rest.*

## **Under-production, corruption and control rights**

Besides state-owned goods, the other lever on the economy is constituted by the State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), the productive arm of the CPV in the generation of wealth. According to well-known communist tenets, the primary objectives of the production function are to produce goods and services and to allocate them in a manner that meets the overall needs of the society. Price and demand are, in the so-called market socialism framework, allowed to be determined by the market and supply will adjust accordingly. The technical question, as it is posited by the CPV, is one of efficient resource allocation and hence of production. At least, that is the theory.

Although prices controls were practically abolished with Doi Moi, and prices of most consumer goods sold through state stores are allowed to be determined by the market, other mechanisms - such as discretionary credit policies, input and output subsidies, import duties, cross-subsidies between SOEs, and political directives - determine the structure of the national production according to the CPV overall priorities. These policies introduce structural distortions and conceal the real production costs. Because of their monopolistic nature, SOEs

manipulate prices and further distort the actual demand for goods. *As a result, real production costs and scarcities cannot be assessed.*

From the standpoint of SOEs' managers, there are no personal incentives to produce since realized financial profit is directly transferred to the state's coffers. There is no competition, and success, therefore, does not come in meeting the requirements of the market at the lowest possible prices. The only measures of success that remain are the CPV directives. To comply with these directives is however difficult since the CPV is really not one but several constituencies. To insure their personal advancement, SOE managers spend their time securing support from these different factions of the CPV and seeking consensus, more credits and exemptions from ministries.

Favors obtained from government officials have to be reciprocated. This trading of mutual advantages and influences renders impossible any tracking of accountability. This kind of "trading system" (8) has helped to breed corruption and dishonesty throughout the economy. Financing, and other privileges, is determined by cozy relationships with the government. The cash flow rights of the State only serve to nurture the political allocation of capital, which constitutes the real source of corruption.

This collusion of interests takes an even deeper dimension. SOE managers and government officials command power over constrained buyers and consumers and can exact bribes most effectively when they create shortages. Shleifer and Vishny described the situation in the Former Soviet Union (FSU) as follows (9): "Managers and bureaucrats prefer to collect bribes, even despite all the waste associated with queuing and lobbying, they will try to create a shortage. The industry's objective is to maximize the value of bribes". *The worst imaginable conditions can now be found assembled in a single environment: distortionary policies which represent structural obstacles to production, combined with a monopolistic context where shortages become a central tool to exact power and bribes.* Vietnam's dreadful economic performance brings these realities to a higher plateau. The SOE sector in Vietnam, which is currently contributing about 30 percent of GDP (10), weighs indeed very heavily against the health of the economy.

A number of other important and related aspects should also be noted.

For the politician or government official, leveraging one's control rights over goods is possible only when property rights are poorly defined. The natural strategy for these politicians and government officials is to cause and perpetuate this situation. In the case where for the same goods, ownership rights (control and cash flow rights) are distributed to different entities (central, local government, and private citizens), as in communist Vietnam; a unique situation is created in which all common ground between these owners is effectively eliminated. *From whatever angle one may look, this arrangement creates an environment in which any advantage gained by some necessarily diminishes the position of others. This condition is a fundamental source of contention and divisiveness in the society and is detrimental to everyone's welfare. It is pitching the ruling class against its own people.*

This focus over income capture and its redistribution at the expense of the creation of wealth includes all the key attributes of a “distributional coalition”, a social phenomenon thoroughly studied by Olson (11). The distributional coalitions are “...overwhelmingly oriented to struggles over the distribution of income and wealth rather than the production of additional output”. *Under these terms, the CPV is a distributional coalition that has, by design, created a highly distorted one-sided economy where its members define policies, rules and regulations to make themselves better off through the control of both legal and economic (i.e., formal and real) rights and capture of income and power generated by those rights.*

The quest for sustainable growth and efficiency has thus become intractable.

## **Cures for shortage conditions**

Economists will tell us that shortages can essentially be cured by removing policy distortions (e.g., monopolistic rights and subsidies) and by liberalizing prices.

Shleifer and Vishny observed that, in the Former Soviet Union (FSU), official prices on certain items were raised 100 and 200 percent in 1991, and then again, in 1992, to combat shortages. The intended effect of the price increases was to raise the profit margin and to create, accordingly, the incentives to produce more. The 1991 and 1992 price increases yielded, however, different outcomes. In the first instance, the production level remained unchanged. In the second instance, the increases in production were remarkable. It is important to understand the differences behind these two situations. Shleifer and Vishny offered the following explanations:

- In the first instance, profit that was realized was entirely taxed away and flowed right back into the State’s Treasury. Profits did not yield any advantages to SOE managers and government planners. Hence, the incentives to produce more were lacking. When prices increased, in that context, the official price became in fact the marginal cost for the SOE manager, making it even harder for him to extract a bribe. As a result, the effect of a 100-200 percent price increase on under-production became more perverse. Managers of the SOEs made shortages of goods worse to maintain their same level of benefits.
- In the second instance, the Yeltsin Government legislated that the store managers could keep a much larger portion of the profits - i.e., profits were not taxed away - and the response was instantaneous as a consequence. There was an instantaneous increase of goods offered on the shelves.

Vietnam, even when viewed under the best angle as a world producer of both rice and coffee, presents a number of striking similarities with the economic conditions of the FSU. Let’s first note that high production in the case of rice and coffee is the result of a mobilization of resources for political purposes, a quite common practice found in communist systems. The small farmer is induced to produce more because he gets an increase in his income. This increase, although important to the farmer, is however negligible in the overall scheme of things. These Vietnamese commodities command much lower prices on the world market, 20 percent in the case of coffee (12), than comparable items produced in other countries. The main cause of

these low prices is due to a lack of quality control because of inconsistent crops, a lack of standardization in processing, insufficient investment in equipment, etc.

Promoting quality control, however, requires a different dimension, a totally different set of yardsticks and processes. Small farmers have no means to play in that league. They have no other choice but to sell their crop at a local market or to an SOE. The SOE in turn has very little incentives to invest in the farmers to establish higher quality control because their interests are clearly conflicting. The state cooperatives, as units of production, will mostly behave the way SOEs behave. For these reasons, price liberalization, in the context of market socialism, has little production-enhancement effect. Under-production under a dire state of poverty definitely characterizes the Vietnamese economy, a condition that is quite similar to the one found in the FSU.

For growth to be sustained, efficient use of resources and enhanced productivity have to become the driving forces in the economy. Nothing in the current environment indicates that these changes will occur any time soon. After all, if these high productions of rice and coffee were real success stories and since they affect the majority of Vietnamese farmers, one should wonder why these farmers remain as consistently poor as they are? The perennial poverty of the farmers reflects indeed a system whose values are misplaced, whose priorities are misdirected and whose institutions are deterrents to private investment and economic growth.

As long as the CPV remains in control of the economy, its objectives will override any other consideration. SOE managers will follow CPV objectives since this is a requirement for advancement. The other potent mechanism for the government elite to gain power and/or to receive income does not come from maximizing SOE production and profit since such actions have little value to government officials (planners or managers). Rather, it comes from creating shortages.

*Price liberalization will increase production only when the producers can keep the profits generated by their work. Property rights to producers have to be recognized and legalized and therefore this, ultimately, calls for the privatization of profits. This is the basis of the cure of under-production and shortages.*

## **Conclusion**

The call for an equal society transcending the greedy needs of particular individuals was very effective in terms of its appeal to the masses. The CPV thought it achieved a communist ideal when it obliterated private property rights and eliminated profit as incentive for individuals. In the final analysis, these dogmatic actions have only served to generate profound and fundamentally destructive forces.

Indeed, the problems of corruption and poverty in Vietnam reside at the very core of the communist system. The property rights perspective offers a comprehensive explanation of corruption and poverty and shows why they have become intractable problems in communist Vietnam.

Prosperity will necessarily require the population at large to have a stake in society. The central building component of prosperity revolves around a satisfied owner. He would guard society against extreme actions. In that respect, history irrefutably points to a well defined and working system of private property rights as a necessary condition of prosperity. Throughout the history of human kind, there does not exist a single counter-example in whatever shape or form.

*Private property rights have to be instituted in Vietnam with the proper institutional supporting framework to render them effective. They are basic rights and represent the clearing of the ground for all subsequent sustainable reforms. They are needed most where they have been the weakest, at the bottom and base of the social pyramid. The resolution of the farmers' problem lays the foundation for a stable society. The successful agrarian reforms in Japan after 1945, and in Formosa in the early 1950s were the basis of the development of these countries, as we know now. Meaningful agrarian reform in Vietnam has clear and successful examples to draw on. It is now high time for the cry of "land to the tillers" to finally assume its real meaning!*

It is useful, as a final note, to gauge the magnitude of the corruption problem in Vietnam. In that regard, an assessment by the International Monetary Fund is quite enlightening. According to Mr. M. Camdessus, the Managing Director of the IMF (13): "the estimates of the present scale of money laundering transactions are almost beyond imagination - 2 to 5 percent of global GDP would probably be a consensus range". Let's clearly note that Mr. Camdessus did not mention any specific country in his address. However, it is very easy to draw a direct link between the money-laundering phenomenon and Vietnam, which has been rated as one the most corrupt countries in the world (14). Simply put, those who take bribes must find safe international havens for their ill-gotten wealth. Vietnam's GDP amounts to about U.S. \$28 billion. Thus, the amount of money laundered from Vietnam should range between U.S. \$560 million and U.S. \$1.4 billion per year. That amount of money laundered is well within the range of the annual budget Vietnam spends on education – i.e., 3.5 percent of GDP per annum. These money laundering numbers provide a chilling idea on the magnitude of corruption in Vietnam. Chilling as it may be, the laundered money is just the visible part of the corruption phenomenon, the tip of the iceberg.

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Thuan Truong is currently specializing in Internet Security and is the Team Leader of the Internet Security group of Learning Services at IBM, USA. He also held positions at Hewlett Packard, the Mitre Corporation, and SAIC.

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